Abstract：In fuzzy demand market environment, considering manufacturer's fairness preference behavior, a Stackelberg game model for dual-channel green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is established. Then the equilibrium strategies of product price and carbon emission reduction level are derived. Finally, numerical examples are presented to explore the influence of consumer's environmental awareness and green manufacturer's fairness preference on the decisions and profits of green supply chain members. It is shown that: As the uncertainty of market demand increases, the product price, the product carbon emission reduction level and the expected profits of the dual-channel supply chain players increase. The higher consumer's environmental awareness is conducive to encouraging the green manufacturer to improve energy conservation and emission reduction technology. The manufacturer's fairness preference behavior will make them pay more attention to the fairness of profit distribution between channels, and lead to the decrease of supply chain operation performance.
李军涛, 刘朋飞, 胡启贤. 模糊环境下考虑公平偏好的绿色供应链博弈研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2021, 18(4): 84-94.
LI Juntao, LIU Pengfei, HU Qixian. Research on Green Supply Chain Game Considering the Fairness Preference in Fuzzy Environment. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2021, 18(4): 84-94.
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