文章检索

网络演化博弈中的自组织临界性

  • 曹亚娟 ,
  • 刘旭升 ,
  • 关剑月 ,
  • 曹亚娟 ,
  • 刘旭升 ,
  • 关剑月
展开
  • 兰州大学物理科学与技术学院, 兰州 730000
曹亚娟(1991-),女,宁夏固原人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为网络演化博弈动力学。

收稿日期: 2016-03-16

  修回日期: 2016-05-04

  网络出版日期: 2025-02-24

基金资助

国家自然科学基金(11475074,11135001);兰州大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(lzujbky-2014-32)

Self-organized Criticality in Spatial Evolutionary Games

  • CAO Yajuan ,
  • LIU Xusheng ,
  • GUAN Jianyue ,
  • CAO Yajuan ,
  • LIU Xusheng ,
  • GUAN Jianyue
Expand
  • School of Physical Science and Technology, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China

Received date: 2016-03-16

  Revised date: 2016-05-04

  Online published: 2025-02-24

摘要

结合雪堆博弈模型与扩展的Bak-Sneppen(BS)模型,研究一维规则环状网络上合作行为的涌现与个体间的动力学关联性。通过统计系统平均合作概率随时间的演化,发现当系统演化到稳态时群体具有较高的合作水平。此外,统计了个体策略突变行为的雪崩尺寸及适应度最低个体间的距离分布,发现这两种分布可近似为幂律分布。这表明系统自组织达到了一种临界状态,在临界状态个体策略在系统尺度上相互关联,因此与系统中高水平合作行为的涌现有着紧密的关系。

本文引用格式

曹亚娟 , 刘旭升 , 关剑月 , 曹亚娟 , 刘旭升 , 关剑月 . 网络演化博弈中的自组织临界性[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2017 , 14(1) : 15 -19 . DOI: 10.13306/j.1672-3813.2017.01.003

Abstract

We study the emergence of cooperation with self-organized criticality on a one-dimensional lattice by connecting Snowdrift Game and Bak-Sneppen (BS) model. We first calculate the mean cooperation probability of the system by Monte-Carlo simulation and the results show that there is a high level cooperation in the steady state,which is possible because the BS mechanism builds dynamical correlation between the least fit sites. Besides, we also measure the distribution of avalanche size and the distance between successive minimum fitness sites, which are well fit by a power law approximately. The power law distribution we measured shows that the system has reached a critical state. In the critical state the agents are correlated at all scales which closely connected with the high level cooperation in the system

参考文献

[1] Gould S J,Eldredge N.Punctuated equilibria:the tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered[J].Paleobiology, 1977, 3:115-151.
[2] Bak P,Tang C,Wiesenfeld K.Self-organized criticality: an explanation of the 1/f noise[J].Phys Rev Lett, 1987, 59:381-384.
[3] Aschwanden M J. Self-Organized Criticality Systems[M].Berlin, Warsaw: Open Academic Press, 2013: 483.
[4] Wang S J,Hilgetag C, Zhou C S. Sustained activity in hierarchical modular neural networks: self-organized criticality and oscillations[J].Front Comput Neurosci,2011, 5:30.
[5] Wang S J, Zhou C. Hierarchical modular structure enhances the robustness of self-organized criticality in neural networks[J].New Journal of Physics, 2012, 14(2):023005.
[6] Wang S J, Ouyang G, Guang J, et al. Stochastic oscillation in self-organized critical states of small systems: sensitive resting state in neural systems[J].Physical Review Letters, 2016, 116(1): 018101.
[7] Ebel H, Bornholdt S. Coevolutionary games on networks[J].Physical Review E, 2002, 66(5): 056118.
[8] Smith J M. Evolution and the Theory of Games[M].New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[9] Hamilton W D. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1964, 7(1): 17-52.
[10] Wedekind C, Milinski M. Cooperation through image scoring in humans[J].Science, 2000, 288(5467): 850-852.
[11] Ohtsuki H, Iwasa Y. How should we define goodness?—reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2004, 231(1): 107-120.
[12] Brandt H, Sigmund K. The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2004, 231(4): 475-486.
[13] Vukov J, Szabó G, Szolnoki A. Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner’s dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs[J].Physical Review E, 2006, 73(6): 067103.
[14] Li P P, Ke J, Lin Z, et al. Cooperative behavior in evolutionary snowdrift games with the unconditional imitation rule on regular lattices[J].Physical Review E, 2012, 85(2): 021111.
[15] Vukov J, Szabó G. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on hierarchical lattices[J].Physical Review E, 2005, 71(3): 036133.
[16] Santos F C, Rodrigues J F, Pacheco J M. Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of cooperation[J].Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 2006, 273(1582): 51-55.
[17] Santos F C, Pacheco J M, Lenaerts T. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations[J].Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2006, 103(9): 3490-3494.
[18] Santos F C, Pacheco J M. Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation[J].Physical Review Letters, 2005, 95(9): 098104.
[19] Nowak M A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation[J].Science, 2006, 314(5805): 1560-1563.
[20] Ebel H, Bornholdt S. Coevolutionary games on networks[J].Physical Review E, 2002, 66(5): 056118.
[21] Lim Y F, Chen K, Jayaprakash C. Scale-invariant behavior in a spatial game of prisoners’ dilemma[J].Physical Review E, 2002, 65(2): 026134.
[22] Killingback T, Doebeli M. Self-organized criticality in spatial evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1998, 191(3): 335-340.
[23] Park S, Jeong H C. Emergence of cooperation with self-organized criticality[J].Journal of the Korean Physical Society, 2012, 60(3): 311-316.
[24] Li W, Luo Y, Wang Y F, et al. A mean-field Bak-Sneppen model with varying interaction strength[J].Chinese Science Bulletin, 2011, 56(34): 3639-3642.
[25] Doebeli M, Hauert C. Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner′s Dilemma and the Snowdrift game[J].Ecology Letters, 2005, 8(7): 748-766.
[26] Perc M, Wang Z. Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game[J].PLoS One, 2010, 5(12): e15117.
[27] Szabó G, Fath G. Evolutionary games on graphs[J].Physics Reports, 2007, 446(4): 97-216.
[28] Bak P, Sneppen K. Punctuated equilibrium and criticality in a simple model of evolution[J].Physical Review Letters, 1993, 71(24): 4083.
文章导航

/

〈 〉