囚徒困境是研究合作策略演化的重要工具,重复囚徒困境下的博弈者可以通过合作实现长期利益的最大化。采用生态演化模拟实验的方法研究在重复囚徒困境中初始环境设定的噪音水平和个体间交互频次对博弈策略演化的影响。研究结果表明,噪声水平和个体间交互频次对最终系统中优胜的博弈策略有决定性作用,这说明环境的初始设定条件是影响博弈策略演化的重要因素。
Prisoner’s dilemma is an important tool to study the adaptation of cooperative strategies. Individuals can maximize their profits by cooperating with each other. In this paper, the method of ecological simulation is adopted to study the effects of noise and interaction frequency on the evolution of cooperative strategies in the context of the Noisy Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (NIPD), a version of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). The results illustrate that noise and interaction frequency are important factors to the surviving strategies.
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