为探究地方政府激励政策对绿色建筑供需双方的影响机理,基于演化博弈与传播动力学理论构建SEIR演化博弈模型,探究开发商与地方政府之间的博弈关系,以及博弈双方不同行为决策下绿色建筑在消费者中的扩散情况。研究结果表明,绿色意识的影响最为显著,随着利益相关方绿色意识水平的提升,绿色建筑的扩散程度在发展阶段达到最大化。此外,地方政府行为决策对绿色建筑扩散的影响大于开发商,补贴政策的激励效果优于税收优惠政策。
To explore the mechanism of local government incentive policies on the supply and demand of green buildings, the study constructs the SEIR evolutionary game model based on the theory of evolutionary game and communication dynamics, exploring the game relationship between developers and local governments and the diffusion of green buildings among consumers under the different behavioral decisions of the two players. Research shows that green awareness exerts the most significant influence, and the diffusion of green buildings is maximized at the development stage as the level of stakeholders′ green awareness increases. In addition, the influence of local government behavior on green building diffusion is more significant than that of developers, and the incentive effect of subsidy policies is better than tax incentives.
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