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| Review on Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemma Games |
| QUAN Ji1, ZHOU Yawen1, WANG Xianjia2
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1.School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China;
2.School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China |
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Abstract The conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation under the complex human behavior model have become the focus of many disciplines. Exploring the conditions for cooperation has both important scientific significance and theoretical value for understanding the institutional arrangements in human society. The social dilemma games provide a theoretical prototype for studying cooperation issues between multiple individuals. As a dynamic analysis method that can describe individuals′ learning and strategy adjustment processes, evolutionary game theory has been one of the most effective frameworks for studying the evolution of cooperation. This review article systematically summarizes the research progress of using the evolutionary game method to study the issues of group cooperation in social dilemma games. Specifically, the following topics are included: research progress of (1) social dilemma game models, evolutionary game theory and equilibrium analysis methods, (2) social dilemma games and the evolution of cooperation under reward/punishment mechanism and reputation mechanism, (3) social dilemma games and the evolution of cooperation with separation strategy and extortion strategy, and (4) social dilemma games and the evolution of cooperation under the network reciprocity. Finally, prospects for further research issues in this area are presented.
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Received: 03 August 2019
Published: 29 April 2020
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