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| Strategy Game Study on Small Catering Merchants Accessing Food Safety Traceability System |
| LÜ Yang1, LIU Zhongyi1, ZHANG Zhenyuan1, LIU Xixi2
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1. School of Public Security Management, People's Public Security University of China, Beijing 100038, China;
2. School of Law, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Ji'nan 250014, China |
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Abstract In order to explore the key factors affecting small catering merchants' access to the food safety traceability system and the choices behavior of the food regulatory sector and the social public, an evolutionary game model among small catering merchants, food regulatory sector and the social public is conducted by using the evolutionary game theory. The impacts of different parameters on the choice of the three-party strategy are analyzed under the assumption of bounded rationality. The results of the study show that, in order to further maintain the food safety environment and prompt small catering merchants to be positive in accessing to the food safety traceability system, a scientific and reasonable reward and compensation mechanism should be established to motivate the social public's enthusiasm to participate in the regulation, reduce the costs of small catering merchants using information technology and achieve a safety supervision on the quality of the whole food chain.
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Received: 11 August 2022
Published: 26 April 2024
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