Abstract Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of collaborative ecological innovation of core enterprises and non-core enterprises in the supply chain under government regulation. And then it analyzes the stability of strategy selection and combines numerical simulation to simulate the impact of different parameter changes on system evolution. The results show that: the higher the income of ecological innovation and the lower the cost, which is conducive to collaborative ecological innovation of enterprises; the free-rider income will have a negative impact on the collaborative ecological innovation of enterprises; there is an optimal co-benefit distribution coefficient that makes the two parties have the greatest probability of collaborative ecological innovation; the government′s subsidy and punishment mechanism has a significant role in promoting the collaborative ecological innovation of enterprises.
YANG Guozhong,ZHOU Wuyang. Evolutionary Game of Enterprises’ Collaborative Ecological Innovation Based on the Perspective of Supply Chain[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science,
2024, 21(2): 120-128.
