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| Evolutionary Game of Airport Foreign Risks Supervision Strategies |
| XIAO Qin, LUO Fan
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| School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China |
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Abstract In order to explore the strategy choice of government regulators, airports and airlines in the control of airport foreign risks, starting with the conceptual model of the government regulators, airports and airlines, a multi-party evolutionary game model of airport Foreign Object Debris risks supervision strategies is built based on game theory, which is used to analyze the stable strategy and evolution path; the system dynamics model is applied to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under pure strategy, static mixed strategy and dynamic government regulation strategy. The simulation results show that when the pure strategy is adopted, evolutionary game model exists effective solution, but there is no stable equilibrium solution; under the condition of mixed strategy and dynamic regulation strategy, there are stable equilibrium solutions, namely reaching the state of government supervision, airport investment, airline cooperation. Strengthening government supervision can effectively promote the airports and airlines to strengthen the control of Foreign Object Debris risks.
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Received: 13 March 2018
Published: 09 January 2019
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