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| Evolutionary Game Simulation of Tripartite Strategy in E-commerce Live Streaming Under Platform Regulation |
| LI Chunfa1, CAO Yingying1, WANG Cong1, HAO Linna2
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1. School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China;
2. School of Business, University of Liaocheng, Liaocheng 252000, China |
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Abstract The optimization of platform regulation strategy is the key to ensure the compliance and legality of suppliers and anchors in live broadcast e-commerce. Aiming at the interest relationship, behavior strategy and game relationship of suppliers, live broadcasting platform and anchor, this paper constructs the behavior strategy evolution game model of the three, reveals the behavior strategy evolution law of live broadcasting e-commerce under the platform regulation, and uses Netlogo to simulate the strategy evolution process. The research shows that the appropriate punishment and restraint of the platform is helpful to standardize the behavior of suppliers and anchors; Higher platform subsidies can encourage suppliers and anchors to standardize their behavior, but at the expense of their own interests, the system is difficult to stabilize; The illegal income factor is an important factor affecting the supplier's supply strategy and anchor behavior choice. Accordingly, the basic strategies and specific measures to standardize the behavior of suppliers and anchors are put forward.
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Received: 20 January 2021
Published: 21 February 2022
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