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Dynamic Mechanisms of Low-carbon Technology Innovation in Manufacturing Enterprises Under the Innovative Voucher Policy |
LIU Shasha1, LU Dongdong2, HU Hao3, SHENG Yongxiang3, WU Jie3
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1. Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhangjiagang 215600, China; 2. Jiangsu Provincial Big Data Management Center, Nanjing Jiangsu 210000, China; 3. School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China |
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Abstract The subsidy of innovation voucher policy for low-carbon technological innovation of manufacturing enterprises has the feature of post-subsidy. This paper constructs a game model of government regulation and manufacturing enterprises to carry out low-carbon technology innovation under the policy of innovative vouchers subsidy. The results show that, first, when government supervision is more than a certain threshold, it can offset the insufficient of innovation motivation in the manufacturing enterprises. Second, government should choose different guidance method according to the innovation risk level: in high-risk situations, the impact of increasing punishment on the evolution speed of enterprises is more significant, thus, the government should promote the evolution of manufacturing enterprises to low-carbon technology innovation strategies through punishment mechanisms; in low-risk situations, the effect of punishment on the evolution speed of manufacturing enterprises tends to be steady, and the increase of subsidy coefficient can speed up their evolution. At this time, the government should take the subsidy mechanism as the mainstay and the penalty mechanism as the supplement to guide manufacturing enterprises to carry out low-carbon technological innovation.
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Received: 14 April 2021
Published: 23 May 2022
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