复杂网络上的演化博弈动力学——一个计算视角的综述

doi:10.13306/j.1672-3813.2017.04.001

Complex Systems and Complexity Science

2017, Vol. 14

Issue (4): 1-13 DOI: 10.13306/j.1672-3813.2017.04.001

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A Computational Survey of Evolutionary Game Dynamics on Complex Networks

TAN Shaolin¹, Lü Jinhu²

1.College of Electrical and Information Engineering, Hunan University, Changsha 410082;
2.Institute of Systems Science, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190

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Abstract Evolutionary games on complex networks is a new interdisciplinary research field at the cross-point of complex networks and evolutionary game. With a complex network and and an evolutionary game dynamics representing the interaction structure among agents and the decision paradigm respectively, evolutionary games on complex networks provides a systematic framework for analyzing and predicting the collective decision-making behaviors of complex interactive populations. This review aims to give a brief survey of evolutionary game dynamics on complex networks from a computational perspective. In detail, we will firstly present a mathematical formulation of the model of evolutionary game dynamics on complex networks, and then analyze the computational complexity of these networked game dynamics, and finally outline some main analytical results about evolutionary game dynamics on complex networks. This computational survey will be a well complement to those simulation results in evolutionary game dynamics on complex networks.

Key words： neworked games evolutionary dynamics complex networks strategy selection

Received: 25 October 2017 Published: 16 January 2019

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TAN Shaolin,Lü Jinhu. A Computational Survey of Evolutionary Game Dynamics on Complex Networks[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2017, 14(4): 1-13.

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https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/EN/10.13306/j.1672-3813.2017.04.001 OR https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/EN/Y2017/V14/I4/1

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