Abstract：This research carries on economics behavioral experiments to study bribery. An experimental platform is designed using the software zTree. Subjects are enrolled to perform the collective interactive experiments. The produced data is analyzed to provide some implications. The experiment results show that the deterrence of punishment is very significant. We also compare the two matching situations, fixed-matching and random-matching. The experiment results show that corruption is easier to be achieved in fixed-match than random-matching which implies that the position rotational system can effectively prevent the occurrence of corruption.
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