Abstract：To explore the factors affecting collaborative innovation between military and civilian enterprises, a four stage game model for technological innovation cooperation between military and civilian enterprises was constructed based on the Cournot model and extended game theory, and numerical simulation analysis was conducted. The results indicate that in cooperative research and development, both technology spillover and R&D efficiency improvement will increase the investment and revenue of both companies, while in independent research and development, technology spillover and R&D efficiency improvement will reduce the R&D investment and revenue of the enterprise; There is heterogeneity between military and civilian enterprises. Therefore, implementing targeted measures to improve research and development efficiency and technology spillover level can promote research and development cooperation and enhance the efficiency of military civilian integration technology innovation cooperation.
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