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Stochastic Evolutionary Game of “Credit Investigation Repair” Chaos Management Under Public Participation |
CHEN Weijie, ZHANG Tao, TANG Yuxiu
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School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 401331, China |
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Abstract In response to the issue of credit chaos during credit repair implementation, this study constructs a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model which involves the government, credit agencies, and the public. Leveraging Itô stochastic differential equation theory, the stability of behavioral strategies for the subjects is analyzed, and combined with numerical simulation to analyze the influence of key variables on the dynamic evolution of game players. The research results reveal that government guidance plays a prominent role in poor social credit environments. In a favorable social credit environment, the government should implement phased and graded regulation to avoid “regulatory capture”. As public recognition and government regulation improve, the effectiveness of governance experiences significant enhancement. Moreover, credit agencies display greater sensitivity to reward parameters than penalty parameters, necessitating the implementation of reasonable incentive and punitive measures by the government. Finally, relevant suggestions are made based on the research findings, which provide effective ideas for the governance of credit chaos and the healthy development of the social credit environment.
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Received: 31 March 2023
Published: 09 October 2025
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