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| On the Credit Evolution of Shared Logistics Market Subject Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game |
| CHEN Jing1,2, LI Siyu1, ZHANG Xiao1, WANG Guoyi1
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1. School of Logistics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China;
2. Beijing Key Laboratory of Logistics System and Technology, Beijing 101149, China |
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Abstract Considering the credit dilemma in the shared logistics operation, a three-party evolutionary game model of the platform-the logistics resource supplier-the logistics resource demander, and credit margin and reward and punishment policies are designed to explore the formation mechanism of the credit dilemma in the shared logistics platform. The research finds that, credit margin system and punishment for fraudulent transactions have a positive effect on the positive evolution of the system, and are positively correlated with the evolution rate; rewarding honesty and subsidizing complaints can promote the evolution of the system in a positive direction to a certain extent, but exceeding the threshold will increase the burden of the shared logistics platform; compared to rewarding integrity, punishing fraud has a more significant impact on the evolution of the system towards a positive direction, so the strategy of punishment first and reward second is more suitable for the healthy and sustainable development of shared logistics.
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Received: 30 May 2023
Published: 10 December 2025
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