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Research on Strategies of Poverty-Alleviation-based Industry Development Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game |
ZHANG Tinghai1, ZHANG Le1a, YANG Zhen2
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1. a. School of International Economics and Trade, b. China Xiaogang Academy, Anhui University of Finance & Economics, Bengbu 233030, China; 2. Department of Economics, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C National Academy of Governance, Beijing 100091, China |
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Abstract To study the strategic choices of PAID’s (Poverty-Alleviation-based Industry Development) participants in poverty-stricken areas, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of poverty alleviation enterprises, impoverished households, and local governments, based on the assumption of bounded rationality. Combining with practical cases, it explores the evolutionary stability strategies of participating entities in different contexts. The result shows that there exists a unique stable equilibrium solution in a tripartite game system, and when the expected returns of the enterprise exceed a certain threshold, it can stimulate the enthusiasm of the participating entities. The proportion of labor force in poverty-stricken areas reflects the key driving role of the implicit poverty alleviation chain. The establishment of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism by the government helps to promote the evolution speed of enterprise strategy selection. The government’s establishment of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism helps to promote the evolution speed of enterprise strategy choices, and the three parties work together to promote the sustainability of PAID.
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Received: 20 August 2023
Published: 09 October 2025
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