Abstract：In order to explore the strategy choice of government regulators, airports and airlines in the control of airport foreign risks, starting with the conceptual model of the government regulators, airports and airlines, a multi-party evolutionary game model of airport Foreign Object Debris risks supervision strategies is built based on game theory, which is used to analyze the stable strategy and evolution path; the system dynamics model is applied to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under pure strategy, static mixed strategy and dynamic government regulation strategy. The simulation results show that when the pure strategy is adopted, evolutionary game model exists effective solution, but there is no stable equilibrium solution; under the condition of mixed strategy and dynamic regulation strategy, there are stable equilibrium solutions, namely reaching the state of government supervision, airport investment, airline cooperation. Strengthening government supervision can effectively promote the airports and airlines to strengthen the control of Foreign Object Debris risks.
[1]Keegan K, Murrell S, Zummo G, et al. Assessment and rehabilitation of foreign object damage potential on airfield shoulder and blast pavements: case of John F. Kennedy international airport, New York[J]. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2005, 1915(1):105-111. [2]Patterson J J. Foreign object debris (FOD) detection research[J]. International Airport Review, 2008, 12(2):22-27. [3]Li X, Keegan K, Yazdani A. Index of foreign object damage in airfield pavement management[J]. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 2010, 46(2153):81-87. [4]陈唯实,李敬. 基于视频数据的机场跑道外来物检测[J]. 北京航空航天大学学报,2014,40(12):1678-1684. Chen Weishi, Li Jing. Foreign object debris detection for airport runway with viedo data [J]. Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2014,40(12):1678-1684. [5]Hussin R, Ismail N, Mustapa S. A study of foreign object damage (FOD) and prevention method at the airport and aircraft maintenance area[J]. IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering, 2016, 152(1):1-9. [6]王维,张清栋. 基于灰色马尔可夫方法的机场FOD事件预测[J]. 中国民航大学学报,2016,34(3):28-32. Wang Wei, Zhang Qingdong. Airport FOD incident prediction based on grey-markov method [J]. Journal of Civil Aviation University of China, 2016,34(3):28-32. [7]杜红兵, 吴军. 基于MMEM-ISM方法的机场外来物风险影响因素分析[J]. 安全与环境学报, 2014, 14(6):8-11. Du Hongbing, Wu Jun. Analysis of the airport foreign object damage risk influencing factors based on MMEM-ISM method [J].Journal of Safety and Environment, 2014, 14(6):8-11. [8]王永刚, 吴立鹏, 陈芳. 基于SD的航空公司不安全事件处罚机制演化博弈研究[J]. 安全与环境学报, 2016, 16(2):169-173. Wang Yonggang, Wu Lipeng, Chen Fang. On the evolutionary game of the airline hazard events punishment mechanism based on SD [J]. Journal of Safety and Environment, 2016, 16(2):169-173. [9]王文轲,蔡洁,陈曾洁,孙琳,李颖. 民航安全监管中的多方演化博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报,2016,26(01):136-141. Wang Wenke, Cai Jie, Chen Zengjie, et al. Research on multi-parties evolutionary game in civil aviation safety supervision [J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2016,26(1):136-141. [10] 赵贤利, 罗帆. 基于系统动力学的跑道侵入风险演化博弈研究[J]. 工业工程, 2015, 18(2):73-79. Zhao Xianli, Luo Fan. A research on evolutionary game of runway incursion risks based on system dynamic [J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2015, 18(2):73-79. [11] 王永刚, 张宇, 陈芳. 基于系统动力学的飞行员违章行为动态演化仿真研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2013, 23(12):28-34. Wang Yonggang, Zhang Ning, Chen Fang. Simulation research on pilot violation based on system dynamics [J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2013, 23(12):28-34. [12] 王先甲,全吉,刘伟兵. 有限理性下的演化博弈与合作机制研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(S1):82-93. Wang Xianjia, Jin Ji, Liu Weibing. Study on evolutionary games and cooperation mechanism within the framework of bounded rationality [J]. System Engineering- Theory & Practice, 2011,31(S1):82-93. [13] 陈福集, 黄江玲. 三方博弈视角下的网络舆情演化研究[J]. 情报科学, 2015,33(9):22-26. Chen Fuji, Huang Jiangling. Study of online public opinions evolution based on three-side game [J]. Information Science, 2015,33(9):22-26. [14] 程敏, 朱前程, 董大旻. 基于系统动力学的建筑安全监管博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2011, 21(12):73-81. Cheng Min, Zhu Qiancheng, Dong Damin. Game study on construction safety supervision based on system dynamics [J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2011, 21(12):73-81.
