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复杂系统与复杂性科学  2025, Vol. 22 Issue (3): 146-152    DOI: 10.13306/j.1672-3813.2025.03.019
  研究论文 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
基于三方演化博弈的产业扶贫策略研究
张廷海1, 张乐1a, 杨振2
1.安徽财经大学 a.国际经济贸易学院,b.中国小岗研究院,安徽 蚌埠 233030;
2.中共中央党校(国家行政学院)经济学部,北京 100091
Research on Strategies of Poverty-Alleviation-based Industry Development Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game
ZHANG Tinghai1, ZHANG Le1a, YANG Zhen2
1. a. School of International Economics and Trade, b. China Xiaogang Academy, Anhui University of Finance & Economics, Bengbu 233030, China;
2. Department of Economics, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C National Academy of Governance, Beijing 100091, China
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摘要 为研究贫困地区产业扶贫参与主体的策略选择,基于有限理性假设,构建扶贫企业-贫困户-地方政府三方演化博弈模型,结合实际案例探析不同情境下参与主体的演化稳定策略。研究发现:三方博弈系统存在唯一稳定均衡解,当企业预期收益高于某一阈值时,可激发参与主体的积极性;贫困地区劳动力比例反映出隐性脱贫链条的关键带动作用;政府设定合理的奖惩机制有助于促进企业策略选择的演化速度,三方共同作用推进产业扶贫的可持续性。
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张廷海
张乐
杨振
关键词 产业扶贫奖惩机制三方演化博弈模拟仿真    
Abstract:To study the strategic choices of PAID’s (Poverty-Alleviation-based Industry Development) participants in poverty-stricken areas, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of poverty alleviation enterprises, impoverished households, and local governments, based on the assumption of bounded rationality. Combining with practical cases, it explores the evolutionary stability strategies of participating entities in different contexts. The result shows that there exists a unique stable equilibrium solution in a tripartite game system, and when the expected returns of the enterprise exceed a certain threshold, it can stimulate the enthusiasm of the participating entities. The proportion of labor force in poverty-stricken areas reflects the key driving role of the implicit poverty alleviation chain. The establishment of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism by the government helps to promote the evolution speed of enterprise strategy selection. The government’s establishment of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism helps to promote the evolution speed of enterprise strategy choices, and the three parties work together to promote the sustainability of PAID.
Key wordsPAID    reward-punishment mechanism    tripartite evolutionary game    simulation
收稿日期: 2023-08-20      出版日期: 2025-10-09
ZTFLH:  F323.8  
  F224.82  
  F279.2  
基金资助:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71974002);教育部人文社科规划基金(18YJA790109);国家社会科学基金一般项目(21BJL033);安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKY2020D45)
通讯作者: 张乐(1997-),女,山东聊城人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为产业经济。   
作者简介: 张廷海(1975-),男,安徽蚌埠人,博士,教授,主要研究方向为产业经济、乡村振兴与治理。
引用本文:   
张廷海, 张乐, 杨振. 基于三方演化博弈的产业扶贫策略研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2025, 22(3): 146-152.
ZHANG Tinghai, ZHANG Le, YANG Zhen. Research on Strategies of Poverty-Alleviation-based Industry Development Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2025, 22(3): 146-152.
链接本文:  
https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/10.13306/j.1672-3813.2025.03.019      或      https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/Y2025/V22/I3/146
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