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复杂系统与复杂性科学  2025, Vol. 22 Issue (4): 145-153    DOI: 10.13306/j.1672-3813.2025.04.019
  研究论文 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
基于微分博弈的网络谣言协同治理行为研究
杨仁彪1, 尹春晓2
1.华中师范大学管理学院,武汉 430079;
2.西南大学教育学部,重庆 400715
On the Cooperative Governance Behavior of Internet Rumors Based on Differential Games
YANG Renbiao1, YIN Chunxiao2
1. School of Information Management, Central China Normal University, Wuhan 430079, China;
2. Faculty of Education, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
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摘要 网络环境中谣言传播会扰乱社会秩序,基于合作博弈视角,探究谣言传播过程中政府部门与社交平台之间的协同治理行为,并结合“3.21东航MU5735飞行事故”相关谣言案例进行深入分析,最后通过模拟仿真加以验证。结果表明:在协同博弈中,政府和平台的参与意愿最高,在Stackelberg主从博弈中,平台的协同意愿较Nash非合作博弈得到了明显提升,但政府的意愿没有增加;协同博弈中政府与平台的整体协同收益最高,Stackelberg主从博弈次之,Nash非合作博弈最低;只有当政府与平台之间的分配系数在一定范围内时,双方的协同行为才能达到帕累托最优状态。
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杨仁彪
尹春晓
关键词 谣言传播协同治理社交平台微分博弈    
Abstract:The spread of rumors in the online environment can disrupt social order. Based on the perspective of a cooperative game, this paper explores the collaborative governance behavior between government departments and social platforms in the process of rumor dissemination and conducts an in-depth analysis by combining with the rumored case of "3.21 China Eastern Airline MU5735 Flight Accident", and finally verifies it through simulation. The results show that, firstly, the government and platform have the highest willingness to participate in the collaborative game, and in the Stackelberg master-slave game, the platform's willingness to collaborate is significantly improved compared with that of the Nash non-cooperative game, but the government's willingness does not increase; secondly, the government and the platform have the highest overall benefit from the collaborative game, followed by the Stackelberg master-slave game and the Nash non-cooperative game. game is the lowest; finally, only when the allocation coefficient between the government and the platform is within a certain range, the synergistic behavior of both parties can reach the Pareto optimal state.
Key wordsspread rumors    collaborative governance    social platforms    differential game
收稿日期: 2023-09-25      出版日期: 2025-12-10
ZTFLH:  G206  
  C912.63  
基金资助:重庆市自然科学基金面上项目(CSTB2023NSCQ-MSX0989)
通讯作者: 尹春晓(1984),女,重庆北碚人,副教授,博士,主要研究方向为信息传播、信息甄别等。   
作者简介: 杨仁彪(1995),男,重庆奉节人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为网络辟谣、网络舆情。
引用本文:   
杨仁彪, 尹春晓. 基于微分博弈的网络谣言协同治理行为研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2025, 22(4): 145-153.
YANG Renbiao, YIN Chunxiao. On the Cooperative Governance Behavior of Internet Rumors Based on Differential Games[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2025, 22(4): 145-153.
链接本文:  
https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/10.13306/j.1672-3813.2025.04.019      或      https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/Y2025/V22/I4/145
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