Abstract：Based on the enhancement of nitrogen circulation efficiency in the watersheds, this paper explores ecological compensation strategy choices of decision-makers, constructs an evolutionary game model of boundedly rational local governments and farmers, and simulates the evolutionary equilibrium strategies. A dynamic ecological compensation policy is proposed, where compensation intensity changes with farmers' behavior, which is conducive to the government's long-term optimization of its policies. The study shows that there exists an equilibrium stability strategy for the system under static ecological compensation policy, meanwhile, the initial cooperation ratio of both parties directly affects the evolutionary rate of the system; the evolutionary trajectory under dynamic policy spirals towards a mixed strategy focus, and the cooperation ratio can be elevated by controlling the ecological compensation ceiling and other crucial factors.
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