Abstract：We study the emergence of cooperation with self-organized criticality on a one-dimensional lattice by connecting Snowdrift Game and Bak-Sneppen (BS) model. We first calculate the mean cooperation probability of the system by Monte-Carlo simulation and the results show that there is a high level cooperation in the steady state,which is possible because the BS mechanism builds dynamical correlation between the least fit sites. Besides, we also measure the distribution of avalanche size and the distance between successive minimum fitness sites, which are well fit by a power law approximately. The power law distribution we measured shows that the system has reached a critical state. In the critical state the agents are correlated at all scales which closely connected with the high level cooperation in the system
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