Abstract：The evolutionary congestion game with attackers and feasible state constrained set is investigated, using the semi-tensor product method of matrix, game dynamic system is transformed into an algebraic form and studied its robustness. Firstly, evolutionary congestion game with attackers and controllers is transformed into an algebraic form. Secondly, the open-loop control and state feedback control are transformed, and the Nash equilibrium is robust for any initial profiles in the restricted set of feasible states. Finally, an example is presented to illustrate that the dynamic system of evolutionary congestion game with attackers can achieve robust reachable equilibrium under open-loop control and state feedback control.
王桂林, 徐勇. 带攻击玩家的演化拥塞博弈的鲁棒性分析[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2020, 17(2): 47-53.
WANG Guilin, XU Yong. Robustness Analysis of Evolutionary Congestion Game with Attackers[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2020, 17(2): 47-53.
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