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复杂系统与复杂性科学  2024, Vol. 21 Issue (2): 120-128    DOI: 10.13306/j.1672-3813.2024.02.015
  研究论文 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
基于供应链视角的企业协同生态创新演化博弈
杨国忠, 周午阳
中南大学商学院,长沙 410083
Evolutionary Game of Enterprises’ Collaborative Ecological Innovation Based on the Perspective of Supply Chain
YANG Guozhong, ZHOU Wuyang
School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
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摘要 基于演化博弈理论建立政府规制下的供应链核心企业和非核心企业协同生态创新的演化博弈模型,并对策略选择进行稳定性分析,结合数值仿真模拟不同参数变化对系统演化的影响。结果表明:生态创新的收益越高成本越低越有助于企业协同生态创新;搭便车收益会对企业协同生态创新产生负向影响;存在一个最佳的协同收益分配系数使得双方选择协同生态创新的概率最大;政府补贴和惩罚机制对企业协同生态创新有显著推动作用。
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杨国忠
周午阳
杨国忠
周午阳
关键词 供应链协同生态创新演化博弈政府规制仿真    
Abstract:Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of collaborative ecological innovation of core enterprises and non-core enterprises in the supply chain under government regulation. And then it analyzes the stability of strategy selection and combines numerical simulation to simulate the impact of different parameter changes on system evolution. The results show that: the higher the income of ecological innovation and the lower the cost, which is conducive to collaborative ecological innovation of enterprises; the free-rider income will have a negative impact on the collaborative ecological innovation of enterprises; there is an optimal co-benefit distribution coefficient that makes the two parties have the greatest probability of collaborative ecological innovation; the government′s subsidy and punishment mechanism has a significant role in promoting the collaborative ecological innovation of enterprises.
Key wordssupply chain    collaborative ecological innovation    evolutionary game    government regulation    simulation
收稿日期: 2022-10-27      出版日期: 2024-07-17
:  F273.1  
  F224.32  
基金资助:湖南省自然科学基金(2021JJ30885);湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会课题(XSP21YBZ074)
通讯作者: 周午阳(1999-),男,山东枣庄人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为技术创新与管理、投融资决策与风险管理。   
作者简介: 第一作者: 杨国忠(1968-),男,湖南岳阳人,博士,副教授,主要研究方向为技术创新与管理、投融资决策与风险管理。
引用本文:   
杨国忠, 周午阳. 基于供应链视角的企业协同生态创新演化博弈[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2024, 21(2): 120-128.
YANG Guozhong, ZHOU Wuyang. Evolutionary Game of Enterprises’ Collaborative Ecological Innovation Based on the Perspective of Supply Chain[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2024, 21(2): 120-128.
链接本文:  
https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/10.13306/j.1672-3813.2024.02.015      或      https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/Y2024/V21/I2/120
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