Abstract：To investigate the impact of carbon emission cost sharing on supply chain decisions, four carbon emission cost sharing supply chain decision models for manufacturers and retailers are developed. The Stackelberg game is applied to solve the problem, and the four decision-making models are analyzed based on evolutionary game theory, and the equilibrium conditions of the evolutionary stable strategy of carbon emission reduction cost sharing are obtained. Research shows that manufacturers′ profits are directly proportional to the proportion of low-carbon investment cost sharing, and are first proportional and then inversely proportional to the proportion of low-carbon marketing cost sharing; Retailers’ profits decrease with the increase of low-carbon investment costs and marketing cost sharing ratio. When the proportion of low-carbon investment and marketing cost sharing, the coefficient of low-carbon investment and marketing cost, and the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to marketing efforts and carbon emissions reduction are within a certain range, the system will reach a stable strategy. Finally, based on the research findings, relevant suggestions are proposed, providing effective ideas for the sustainable development of low-carbon cost sharing businesses in the supply chain.
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