Abstract：In order to provide a decision-making reference for physician over-treatment problems, the study established an evolutionary game model based on the game relationship between physician and patient. The result showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy under the patient's static search knowledge strategy and there is a unique evolutionary stable strategy when the patient dynamically searches for knowledge. As the main conclusions, improving the effectiveness of knowledge in the unit, and increasing the reputational loss coefficient for physician's over-treatment behavior are effective manners to reduce the cost of knowledge search for a unit. The behavior of the physician group which has a lower ability and adopts a smaller degree of over-treatment should be paid more attentions. The focus of supervision should be on diseases with less room for growth of medical expenses.
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