Study on Evolutionary Game of General Aviation Safety Supervision Based on Complex Network
XIAO Qin1, LUO Fan2
1. School of Management, Wuhan Institute of Technology, Wuhan 430205, China; 2. School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Abstract：In order to explore the evolution mechanism of the cooperation behavior of general aviation enterprises on safety supervision, an evolution game model is proposed based on the perspective of complex network. With the model, this paper analyzes the influence of network size, network average degree, cumulative payoff weight, cost-income ratio, reward and punishment of regulators. The results show that the increase of network size and network average degree contributes to the increase of the equilibrium density of cooperators; the increase of cumulative payoff weight promotes the cooperation behavior in the network; however, the increase of cost-income ratio inhibits the game cooperation behavior in the network; government reward and punishment can promote the cooperation behavior, and the effect of punishment is more significant than reward. The regulatory strategies of general aviation safety can be concluded including increasing government support, building network communication platform, reducing enterprise operation cost, and building industry reward and punishment mechanism.
肖琴, 罗帆. 基于复杂网络的通用航空安全监管演化博弈研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2022, 19(3): 33-43.
XIAO Qin, LUO Fan. Study on Evolutionary Game of General Aviation Safety Supervision Based on Complex Network[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2022, 19(3): 33-43.
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