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复杂系统与复杂性科学  2024, Vol. 21 Issue (1): 145-151    DOI: 10.13306/j.1672-3813.2024.01.019
  研究论文 本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
小餐饮商户接入食品安全溯源体系策略博弈研究
吕洋1, 刘忠轶1, 张振源1, 刘溪溪2
1.中国人民公安大学公安管理学院,北京 100038;
2.山东财经大学法学院,济南 250014
Strategy Game Study on Small Catering Merchants Accessing Food Safety Traceability System
LÜ Yang1, LIU Zhongyi1, ZHANG Zhenyuan1, LIU Xixi2
1. School of Public Security Management, People's Public Security University of China, Beijing 100038, China;
2. School of Law, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Ji'nan 250014, China
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摘要 为探究影响小餐饮商户接入食品安全溯源体系的关键因素及食品监管部门和社会公众的行为选择,基于演化博弈理论,构建了小餐饮商户、食品监管部门以及社会公众三方之间的演化博弈模型。在有限理性的假设下,分析了不同参数对博弈三方策略选择的影响。研究结果表明:为进一步维护食品安全环境,促使小餐饮商户选择积极接入食品安全溯源体系,应建立科学合理的奖惩与补偿机制,调动社会公众参与监管的积极性,利用信息技术手段降低小餐饮商户成本,实现食品全链条质量安全监管。
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吕洋
刘忠轶
张振源
刘溪溪
关键词 食品安全溯源体系小餐饮商户演化博弈    
Abstract:In order to explore the key factors affecting small catering merchants' access to the food safety traceability system and the choices behavior of the food regulatory sector and the social public, an evolutionary game model among small catering merchants, food regulatory sector and the social public is conducted by using the evolutionary game theory. The impacts of different parameters on the choice of the three-party strategy are analyzed under the assumption of bounded rationality. The results of the study show that, in order to further maintain the food safety environment and prompt small catering merchants to be positive in accessing to the food safety traceability system, a scientific and reasonable reward and compensation mechanism should be established to motivate the social public's enthusiasm to participate in the regulation, reduce the costs of small catering merchants using information technology and achieve a safety supervision on the quality of the whole food chain.
Key wordsfood safety traceability system    small catering merchants    evolutionary game
收稿日期: 2022-08-11      出版日期: 2024-04-26
ZTFLH:  O157.5  
基金资助:中国人民公安大学公共安全行为科学与工程科技创新项目(2022KXGCKJ04);中国人民公安大学基本科研业务费学科基础理论体系项目(2022JKF02004);北京社科基金重点项目(22GLA011);中国人民公安大学公共安全风险防控教育部工程研究中心科研项目(GCZX202101-7)
通讯作者: 刘忠轶(1983-),男,河北沧州人,博士,副教授,主要研究方向为公安管理、企业管理。   
作者简介: 吕洋(1998-),男,山东泰安人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为公安管理、企业管理。
引用本文:   
吕洋, 刘忠轶, 张振源, 刘溪溪. 小餐饮商户接入食品安全溯源体系策略博弈研究[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2024, 21(1): 145-151.
LÜ Yang, LIU Zhongyi, ZHANG Zhenyuan, LIU Xixi. Strategy Game Study on Small Catering Merchants Accessing Food Safety Traceability System[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2024, 21(1): 145-151.
链接本文:  
https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/10.13306/j.1672-3813.2024.01.019      或      https://fzkx.qdu.edu.cn/CN/Y2024/V21/I1/145
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