Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dynamic Cooperative Behavior of Top-management Teams in Mixed Ownership Enterprises
SONG Mei1, WANG Zhenyuan1, GE Yuhui2, LIU Jusheng3
1. School of Economics and Management, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, China; 2. Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China; 3. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201701, China
Abstract：Based on the perspective of bounded rationality, this paper first constructed a dynamic game model of dynamic cooperative behavior to explore this problem. Secondly, it discussed the impact of contract fines, government incentives, cooperation costs, and cooperation revenues on the evolution of top-management team behavior. Finally, it carried out numerical simulation and correlation analysis on its evolution process. The research shows that the final strategy of the two sides in the cooperation of the senior management team of mixed ownership enterprises will be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy, and will not be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy of one party. Among them, within a certain range, increasing the penalty of contract, increasing government incentives, reducing cooperation costs, and increasing the coefficient of cooperation revenue can promote the transformation from non-cooperation to cooperation. We hope that this study can provide some reference significance for the smooth progress of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and form efficient institutional arrangements.
宋美, 王振源, 葛玉辉, 刘举胜. 混合所有制企业高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈分析[J]. 复杂系统与复杂性科学, 2024, 21(1): 85-91.
SONG Mei, WANG Zhenyuan, GE Yuhui, LIU Jusheng. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dynamic Cooperative Behavior of Top-management Teams in Mixed Ownership Enterprises[J]. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2024, 21(1): 85-91.
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